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The Borda Game
Abstract
Recently, a number of authors have constructed axiomatic defences of Borda's rule [2, 4, 8], In every case, it Is
assumed that voters mark their ballots honestly, in accordance with their preferences. That this assumption
may be unrealistic was known to Borda himself [ij. Elsewhere • [3, 5], it has been shpwn how Borda's rule can
reward misrepresented pref erences on the part of individual voters. This result is in the same spirit as, but not
a consequence of, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [6, 7], since Borda's rule allows ties. This is in marked
contrast to Condorcet's rule, where such misrepresentation is not rewarded.
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THE BORDA GAME
Abstract
This paper considers elections using Borda's rule as cooperative games
in normal form. It is shown that such a Borda game with many alternatives
has the same strategic properties as two-thirds majority rule.. Also revealed
is a tension between honest and dishonest voting in "a Borda game, in that
the largest possible losing coalition under honest voting Is greater than^
the smallest possible winning coalition under optimal dishonest voting.
Roy Gardner
Department of Economics
Iowa State University
Ames, Iowa 50011
1. Introduction
Recently, a number of authors have constructed axiomatic defences of
Borda's rule [2, 4, 8], In every case, it Is assumed that voters mark
their ballots honestly, in accordance with their preferences. That this
assumption may be unrealistic was known to Borda himself [ij. Elsewhere
• [3, 5], it has been shpwn how Borda's rule can reward misrepresented pref
erences on the part of individual voters. This result is in the same
spirit as, but not a consequence of, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
[6, 7], since Borda's rule allows ties. This is in marked contrast to
Condorcet's rule, where such misrepresentation is not rewarded.> In this
paper we pursue the strategic differences between Borda and Condorcet
elections In a setting with "many" voters, where individual misrepresen
tation is insignificant. Modelling elections as cooperative games in
normal form, we show that the set of winning coalitions of a Borda game
(1) is a proper subset of that of a Condorcet g^e, and (2) shrinks mono-'
tonely with.an increase in the number of alternatives. These results
reveal a tension between honest and dishonest Borda voting, in terms of a
growing difference between what a coalition of voters can assure itself
by voting dishonestly and what a coalition of voters may suffer if it
votes honestly. Again, this is a tension that does not afflict Condorcet
elections. The evidence we present suggests that, however appealing when
voters vote honestly, Borda elections will generally lead to quite'
different results when voters are aware of their strategic power.
2. Formal Preliminaries
We consider a non-atomic measure space of voters ([0, 1], S, L),
where S is the class of Lebesgue measurable subsets of the unit interval
. t
and L is Lebesgue measure: Voting takes place over a finite set of
alternatives M, denoted'}l, 2,...,ml, with m s 2. Each voter tgLO, 1]
has an irreflexive, complete, and transitive ordering of M, denoted P(t);
individual indifference between alternatives is excluded. When agent t
prefers alternative i to alternative ,j, we write iP(t)j. The set of all
such orderings of M is denoted p. A distribution of opinion is a proba
bility measure g, on p. If PgP, then |j,(P) is the probability that a voter
drawn at random will have the preference ordering P; formally,-|j,(P) =
Lit: P(t) = P],
An election f is a map from p to 2^. The range of f is the choice,
set. The two elections with which we are concerned are those of Condorcet
(f^) and Borda (f^). - . . '
Let - Ljt: iP(t)j| when the distribution of opinion is y,;.
Then an alternative i is a Condorcet choice for the distribution of opinion
y,, written igf^Cpj), if and only if L..(|j,) > L..(y,) for every jgM, j i.
^ J J ^
It.is easy to show that f^(y,) is either a singleton or the empty set.
The Bordascore of alternative i, for the distribution of opinion
is given by .
1 ^ j £ m
j 7^ i
An alternative i is a Borda choice, iefg(^), if and only if ho'other
alternative gets a higher' Borda score. It is easy to see' th^t
takes on any value in 2^, except the empty set.
Notice that elections are defined in terms of the distribution of
opinion as it exists, y,. Now if each voter votes honestly, then )jb is
indeed.the input to the electoral process; however, if some group of
individuals should vote dishonestly, then the input to the electoral
process will not equal This observation is crucial to what follows.
3. Strategic Voting and the Critical Number
Any voting other than honest we shall ca^ strategic. To follow the
implications of strategic voting, we shall interpret the election as a
cooperative game in normal form. The strategies open to a coalition Sg 5
then are the various possible announced preferences of its members. Now
the power of a coalition to influence the outcome of the election is some
function of its size and the way its members vote. We shall call this
function the critical number of an election, c(f). The critical number is
such that for any coalition S with L(S) > c(f), there is an announcement
of preferences (possibly strategic) which enables S to guarantee the
•selection of any alternative. The following propositions specify the
critical numbers c(f„) and c(f_) for Condorcet and Borda elections
respectively.
Proposition.1. c(f^) = 1/2.
Proof. Suppose L(S) > 1/2. For every tgS, the strategy iP(t)j, for
all jgM, j 7^ i, guarantees the Condorcet choice of 1.
We shall call a coalition S winning if L(S) > c(f). The winning
coalitions of a Condorcet election are the jS; L(S) > 1/2].
Note that a Condorcet choice under honest voting cannot be profitably'
upset .by any'coalition S through strategic voting. Suppose a Condorcet
choice 1 could be so upset. Then there must exist coalition S and alter-'
native j such that for all tgS, jP(t)i and L(S) > 1/2; but this contradicts
the fact that for all j, ^ 1/2. Note also that the critical number
of a Condorcet election does not depend on the number of alternatives, m.
Proposition 2. c(f_) =
B jm - 2
Proof. Suppose coalition S of size L(S) wants to guarantee the
Borda choice of i. S does not know how the counter coalition [0, 1] - S
. will vote. Thus, S can only be sure of electing i if i's Borda score is
greater than j's for all j and all votes of the counter coalition. Now
the best S can do to achieve this is to have all its members rank i first,.
, the split up into (m 1)1 equal size'prices, corresponding to each of
the permutations of the (m - 1) remaining alternatives. In this case,
coalition S gives alternative i the Borda score
(m - 1) L(S)
and each other alternative the Borda score
- L(S)
Now the counter coalition best counters this strategy by that of having
all its members rank i last and to some other alternative j first, giving j the
Borda number
(m - 1) (1 - L(S))
and i the Borda number
- (m - 1) (1 - L(S)).
Then i beats j if and only if
(m - 1)[L(S) - (1 - L(S))] > (m - 1) (1 - L(S)),- L(S)
which implies
L(S) > .
3m - 2
In particular, given m, the set of winning coalitions of a Borda
election are the j.S: L(S) > .
3in - 2
, Combining propositions (1) and (2), we see at once that, for m> 3,
~ 1/2; thus, the set of winning coalitions of a Borda game
is a proper subset of those of the corresponding Condprcet game. From
proposition (2), we further see that cCf^; m) > cCf^; m- 1); .thus, the
set of winning coalitions shrinks monotonely with an increase in alter
natives. The limit of this process is the critical number 2/3. From a
strategic point of view, then, Borda voting with many alternatives is
equivalent to 2/3 majority rule.
4. The Strategic Tension of Borda, Voting
We say that a strategic tension exists whenever the outcome of an-
election given honest voting can be upset by- strategic voting. We shall
show that a Borda election not only gives rise to strategic tension, but
that the tension grows stronger with the number of alternatives.
Proposition 3. Given m, an alternative can have at most an
m •
majority against every alternative in a Borda election and still lose.
Proof. Without loss of generality, consider the situation when
for 1 > Q? > 1/2, a of the electorate has the preferences
IP 2P ... Pm
and 1 - (y has the preferences
2P ,,. PI
(Only the rankings of alternative.1 and 2 matter here,)
Thus alternative 1 has at least an cy majority against every other
alternative. The Borda number of alternative 1 is
(m - l)(Qf - (1 - cy)) - (m - 1)(2cy - 1);
the Borda number of alternative 2 is
(m-2) - l+(l-Q;).-a=m-l - 2ry.
Alternative 2 beats alternative I under honest voting when
m - 1 - 2a > (m - l)(2a - 1)
which implies
m - 1
m
We shall call ^ the largest losing majority (LLM) of a Borda election.
Combining the results of propositions 2 and 3 reveals a strategic
tension.
For m > 2,
LUM == " " ^ > c(f ) ^
m 3m - 2 *
Thus, there is a gap between largest losing majority and potentially
winning majority. Alternative j could be the Borda choice of honest
voting; yet there exist another alternative i, in whose favor the coalition
It; iP(t)j| has both the incentive and power to upset the election.
If we measure the extent of strategic tension by the size of this
gap, that is
strategic tension « LIM - c(f ),
B
then it is clear that the strategic tension grows with the number of alter-
natives, ultimately reaching 1/3. A coalition may exceed the critical
number by a measure of 1/3 and still lose the election-an unlikely result
for any coalition aware of its strategic power.
There are two other strategic aspects of Bprda voting worth noting
in conclusion. First, it may turn out .that no alternative has critical
majority for or against it. This happens for distributions of opinion
in the neighborhood of the uniform distribution on P. In such a case,
there is no strategic reason for expecting the choice of any given
alternative. Second, it may turn out that every alternative has .a '
critical majority against it. This happens for distribution of opinion
in the neighborhood of evenly distributed cyclic preferences. In such
a case, there is strategic reason for expecting a deadlock, with no
winning alternative. As with strategic tension, both of these cases
lead one to results rather different from those of the hypothesis of
honest voting.
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